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Abstract
The right response to a speculative attack on the domestic currency by
the monetary authorities in a country with dollarized liabilities has been a
matter of hot debate among academics and policy makers especially after
the East Asian Crisis. Using a modi¯ed version of the currency crisis model
discussed in Proa~ no, Flaschel and Semmler (2005) we show that an increase of
the domestic interest rate by the central bank as a response to the speculative
attack can have serious negative e®ects on aggregate demand by depressing
the investment of the subsector of domestic ¯rms which are not indebted in
foreign currency. We demonstrate that in speci¯c situations the standard
(IMF supported) increase of the domestic interest rate might not be the best
response to a speculative attack on the domestic currency from the medium
term point of view.
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11 Introduction
The right response by the monetary authorities to a speculative attack on the do-
mestic currency in a country with a signi¯cant fraction of foreign currency liabilities
has been a matter of hot debate among academics and policy-makers in the years
after the East Asian Crisis. Indeed, since a devaluation of the domestic currency
can deteriorate dramatically the balance sheets of the domestic ¯nancial and en-
trepreneurial sectors by means of a currency mismatch between the value of assets
and liabilities,1 the majority of policy makers show a certain degree of\fear of °oat-
ing"2 and see in the defense of the prevailing exchange rate level the best response
to a speculative attack, given the potential fragility of the domestic ¯nancial sys-
tems. Additionally, since only a limited amount of foreign reserves3 is available to
the central banks in the short run, and since the borrowing of foreign funds becomes
more di±cult during episodes of ¯nancial turmoil, an increase in the domestic in-
terest rate (in order to make domestic bonds more attractive and hence reduce the
pressure in the foreign exchange market) is considered by the majority of economists
as the most appropriate, practicable and sustainable way to defend the prevailing
exchange rate. Nevertheless, Radelet and Sachs (1998) and Furman and Stiglitz
(1998), among others, have expressed serious concerns about the e®ectiveness and
the adequacy of such a measure due to its potential negative e®ects on the aggregate
investment and demand of the economy.
During the East Asian Crisis, the IMF o±cials chose the ¯rst point of view and
advised the respective economies to increase domestic interest rates in order to
prevent currency mismatches and the activation of credit constraints by ¯nancial
sector. IMF Deputy Managing Director Shigemitsu Sigusaki for example stated:
\We know that higher interest rate are likely to hurt the corporate sector, but
an appreciation of the currency that follows a tightening of monetary conditions
would greatly bene¯t those corporations indebted in foreign currency. There is no
alternative in the short term. A relaxation of the monetary policy would only lead
to further depreciations of the currencies".4 Due to the fact that in the East Asian
crisis nearly all exchange rate regimes collapsed due to the foreign exchange market
pressures despite domestic nominal interest rate increases, the advice of the IMF
1See e.g. Eichengreen and Hausmann (1999), Mishkin (1996), Krugman (2000) and Kaminsky
and Reinhart (2001). The theoretic models discussed in Aghion, Bacchetta and Banerjee (2001)
and Flaschel and Semmler (2003) show how a currency crisis can lead to a widespread ¯nancial
crisis and therefore to a signi¯cant economic slowdown due to the activation of credit constraints
and the subsequent decrease in the aggregate investment.
2See Calvo and Reinhart (2002).
3Recent research has focused on the role of the international reserves of the central bank in the
design of optimal monetary policy rules for small open economies, see Kato and Semmler (2005).
4See Radelet and Sachs (1998, p.49).
2was sharply criticized in the years after, pushing forward even more the academic
debate.5
The purpose of this paper is to explicitly model in a theoretical framework the
exchange rate policy dilemma which the monetary authorities in emerging market
economies are facing and to explore to what extent the orthodox monetary policy
recommendation of an increase in the domestic interest rate is the right measure
to follow during a speculative attack, in an economy with a fraction of liabilities
denominated in foreign currency. A similar line of research has been recently pursued
also by Christiano, Gust and Roldos (2004) and Braggion, Christiano and Roldos
(2005) within a general equilibrium framework. Their work however does not take
into account country speci¯c characteristics, as e.g. di®erent interest rate elasticities
of aggregate money demand, for the monetary policy reaction to ¯nancial crises, as
our model does.6
In our framework the optimal response by the monetary authorities to a speculative
attack on the domestic currency depends on the degree of foreign currency indebted-
ness in the economy (and therefore on the potential impact of a currency mismatch)
and on the elasticity of aggregate investment demand with respect to domestic in-
terest rate changes. We attempt to highlight the pitfalls of one-size-¯ts-all receipts
for the conduct of monetary policy in emerging market economies.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In section 2 we present some
empirical facts concerning the impact of nominal exchange and interest rates on ag-
gregate investment in selected East Asian countries by means of a VARX analysis.
In section 3, the model developed in Proa~ no et al. (2005) is modi¯ed to capture
in particular the negative in°uence of an increase in the domestic interest rate on
aggregate demand, i.e., we explicitly model the dilemma exchange rate policy is fac-
ing in emerging market economies. We discuss the role of the international reserves
on the onset of a currency crisis and explore the local stability properties of the
modi¯ed model also in section 3. Section 4 analyzes on this basis di®erent policy
scenarios that are conceivable in the modi¯ed model when the exchange rate policy
dilemma is taken into account. Empirical evidence which supports the results of
5See Corsetti, Pesenti and Roubini (1999) and Radelet and Sachs (1998).
6Furthermore, the authors do not explicitly focus on the currency mismatch problem and their
model does not possess multiple equilibria as our theoretic framework does. The authors summarize
the somewhat puzzling results of their model in the following way: \the optimal response to a
¯nancial crisis is an initial sharp rise in the interest rate, followed by a fall to below pre-crisis
levels."Braggion et al. (2005, p.1). This conclusion, nevertheless, is erroneous because the initial
rise in the interest rates is not a consequence of monetary policy actions but the outcome of the
activation of the credit constraints and therefore the increase in the value (in units of the traded
good) of the capital stock in the traded and non-traded sector, see also Braggion et al. (2005, p.16).
Only the subsequent fall in the interest rates can be seen as the result of policy actions since it
comes from the injection of liquidity by the monetary authorities.
3the theoretical model developed in the section 4 is also presented there. Section 5
concludes.
2 VARX Analysis
The East Asian, as well as the Mexican (1994-95) crisis, is a quite particular episode
in recent history due to the abruptness and extent to which the real side of the econ-
omy was a®ected by the sharp devaluations of the domestic currency. As previously
discussed, the fact that in the majority of cases the domestic monetary authori-
ties tried, unsuccessfully, to defend the prevailing nominal exchange rate by raising
the domestic short term interest rates (a measure which was recommended by the
IMF) raises the question whether that strategy was not in part responsible for the
subsequent sharp decline in the aggregate demand, and especially in the aggregate
investment, as it will be discussed below in the model scenario sketched in ¯gure 7.
In ¯gure 1 we show time series data of Mexico and selected East Asian countries
for the 1990s, the decade when currency and ¯nancial crises took place in those
countries. In all cases a sharp nominal exchange rate depreciation, caused by a
successful speculative attack, as well as a rise in the domestic interest rates (due
to the intervention of the domestic monetary authorities) preceded an abrupt and







































































Figure 1: Real Aggregate Investment, Exchange and Interest Rates
(First Quarter = 100, in logs)
This collapse of the aggregate investment in nearly all attacked East Asian countries
has been explained by the majority of researchers by means of an open-economy
4version of the ¯nancial accelerator concept introduced by Bernanke, Gertler and
Gilchrist (1994), which explains the credit awarding by the ¯nancial intermediaries
as being dependent on the net worth of the entrepreneurial sector. Now, since
in the 1990s the domestic ¯rms in many emerging market economies obtained new
access to international credit (normally in foreign currency) due to ¯nancial markets
liberalization during that decade, their state of their balance sheets became also
dependent on the nominal exchange rate. In the next section we investigate, in
a very simple manner, the dynamic interaction of the nominal exchange rate, the
domestic nominal interest rate and the aggregate investment in a sample of East
Asian countries by means of an unrestricted VARX (vector autoregressive model
with exogenous terms) estimation.7
For our analysis we use time series data of aggregate investment (in constant 1995
prices, seasonally adjusted), the respective nominal bilateral US-Dollar exchange and
domestic interest rates of Mexico (MX), Malaysia (MA), Thailand (TH), Indonesia
(ND), South Korea (SK) and the Philippines (PH) stemming from the International
Statistical Yearbook 2003. As endogenous variables in the VARX model we use the
logs of these variables. The exogenous variables in the model are impulse dummies
which capture the nonlinear sharp nominal depreciations resulting from the specu-
lative attacks on the respective currencies. The lag order of the VARX models was
chosen according to the Schwarz information criterion. We report these statistics,
the VARX estimation results (obtained by Generalized Least Squares) as well as the
corresponding residual serial correlation LM tests for all estimated countries in the
appendix.
For the impulse response analysis of the estimated VARX models we use general-
ized one standard deviation innovations as proposed by Pesaran and Shin (1998).
The principal advantage of this type of impulse response analysis is that the re-
sulting impulse response functions (generated by an orthogonal set of innovations)
are independent of the ordering of the endogenous variables in the VARX model,
in contrast to the standard Cholesky orthogonalization procedure. We show the
estimated dynamic responses of the real aggregate investment to a generalized one
standard deviation shock in the nominal exchange and interest rate below.
As can be observed in ¯gure 2, the reaction of aggregate investment to a shock in the
nominal exchange rate and interest rate varies signi¯cantly across countries. While
in Mexico the extent and duration of both responses was relatively low (what would
explain the fast recovery of the Mexican economy after the 1994-1995 Tequila cri-
sis), in the other countries the recovery of aggregate investment has a much longer
duration. An additional and probably more interesting ¯nding is the heterogeneous
relative strength of the nominal exchange and interest rates across countries. While
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Figure 2: Response of the Log of Aggregate Investment to a Generalized One Std.
Dev. Innovation in the Logs of the Nominal Exchange and Interest Rates
in Mexico, Malaysia, Thailand and South Korea the exchange rate shock a®ects in
a more signi¯cant manner the respective aggregate investment levels, in Indonesia
and the Philippines the interest rate e®ect seems to have predominated during the
estimation period. Now, even if these empirical ¯ndings are not de¯nitive in their
implications with respect to the main determinant (if there was only one) of the
investment decline in the East Asian countries, they nevertheless open up the ques-
tion whether, at least in some countries, the defense of the currency pegs through
interest rate increases might perhaps not have been the most adequate response to
the speculative attacks on the domestic currencies. In the next section we develop
a theoretical model which might shed some light on this discussion.
3 The Model
We analyse a small open economy of Mundell-Fleming-Tobin type as basically dis-
cussed in R¿dseth (2000). The analyzed time span is assumed to be short enough
to allow for the assumption of a basically unchanging capital stock K as well as
private ¯nancial wealth Wp, the ¯rms' foreign currency and domestic currency debt
Ff and Bf, respectively, despite the presence of positive or negative net investment
and households' savings. Since foreign prices are assumed to be constant and are
normalised to one (p¤ = 1), the real exchange rate can be de¯ned as ´ = e=p. In
contrast to Flaschel and Semmler (2003) and Proa~ no et al. (2005), where the total-
ity of the domestic ¯rms ¯nanced its investment projects through foreign currency
denominated credit (which implied that the domestic interest rate did not a®ect the
6aggregate demand directly), we assume here that there are two di®erent groups
of ¯rms in the economy which desire to undertake investment projects. While a
fraction of the domestic ¯rms À ¯nances its investment projects through foreign cur-
rency denominated credits, the other fraction (1 ¡ À) borrows domestic currency.8
The balance sheet of the two fractions of domestic ¯rms is represented in table 1
as following: The net worth of a ¯rm is de¯ned as the di®erence between its assets
Table 1: Business Sector's Balance Sheets
Business Sector's Balance Sheets
Firms' Fraction Assets Liabilities
À ÀpK eFf
1 ¡ À (1 ¡ À)pK Bf
and its liabilities (both expressed here in domestic currency). Note that while the
exchange rate in°uences the net worth of the ¯rms with foreign currency liabilities,
the net worth of the other fraction of ¯rms (1 ¡ À) remains una®ected by changes
in the exchange rate.
Based on the ¯nancial accelerator concept introduced by Bernanke et al. (1994),
we assume that banks (domestic and foreign) evaluate the creditworthiness of the
domestic ¯rms based on their actual net worth, or more precisely on their debt-to-
capital ratio ~ qÀ = eFf=Àp ¹ K = ~ qÀ(´) and ~ q1¡À = Bf=(1 ¡ À)pK (we assume here
Ff < 0 and Bf < 0, indicating a negative foreign and domestic currency bond stock
held by domestic ¯rms, or in other words, that ¯rms are indebted). Despite the fact
that both groups might be subject to the imposition of credit constraints by the
¯nancial sector, their net worth is composed in a di®erent way.
A glance at the balance sheet of the fraction of domestic ¯rms À can clarify why
a devaluation of the real exchange rate has a negative e®ect on credit awarded by
banks to the group of ¯rms with foreign currency liabilities À: a rise of the nominal
exchange rate (or an decrease of the domestic price level) leads to an increase in
the nominal (and here also real) value of the liabilities of this group and therefore
to a decrease in its net worth. The other share of domestic ¯rms (1 ¡ À), which is
not indebted in foreign currency, is not a®ected by a devaluation of the domestic
currency. We assume that the totality of the foreign currency debt is unhedged.
As discussed e.g. in RÄ othig, Flaschel and Semmler (2005), with increasing cur-
rency hedging by the domestic ¯rms, the fragility of the real side of the economy to
unexpected exchange rate depreciation decreases.
8For simplicity we assume that each ¯rm possesses the same amount of capital so that the
distribution of the aggregate capital stock between these two groups is represented also by À.
7The aggregate investment function, consistent with the aggregate investment by the
two groups, can be thus expressed as
I = ÀI (¹ i
¤; ~ q





with ¹ r¤ = i¤ ¡ ^ p¤ = r¤ and r = i ¡ ^ p. Despite the fact that the share of domestic
¯rms borrowing in À is kept constant here, one could think of it as being a function
of the risk premium ». For now we will just assume that due to ¯nancial technology
di®erences or ¯rm size factors not the totality but only a constant fraction of the
domestic entrepreneurial sector can actually obtain credits denominated in foreign
currency.
As in Krugman (2000), we assume that the elasticity of the investment function
with respect to ´ is state-dependent, so that while for high and low values of ´ (of
~ qÀ) the investment reaction is assumed to be inelastic, for intermediate values of ´
(of ~ qÀ), by contrast, the elasticity of the gross investment function with respect to
changes in the real exchange rate (in the debt-to-capital ratio) is high, re°ecting the
nonlinear activation of credit constraints by the ¯nancial sector. Such an aggregate
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Figure 3: A Balance Sheet Dependent Investment Function
Even though the above gross investment function is of a very simple nature, it incor-
porates the ¯nancial accelerator concept and, more generally, the basic implications
of the theory of imperfect capital markets, leading to the possibility of multiple
equilibria and, therefore, to the existence of \normal" and \crisis" steady states re-
spectively. Note nevertheless that the magnitude of the balance sheet e®ect depends
in a great manner on À, that is on the degree of liability dollarization of the economy.
For À = 1, i.e. in the case of total liability dollarization (as in Flaschel and Semmler
(2003)), the balance sheet e®ect alone (except changes in the foreign interest rate)
determines the level of aggregate investment. For À = 0, on the contrary, changes
in the real exchange rate do not directly a®ect the ¯nancial state of the domestic
¯rms.
8The goods market equilibrium can again be expressed as
Y = C1(Y ¡ ¹ T) + I(¹ i
¤; ~ q
À(´);r; ~ q
1¡À) + ± ¹ K + ¹ G + X(¹ Y
¤;´): (2)
with Y ¡ ¹ T denoting the disposable income, ¹ T lump sum taxes, ¹ G the government
consumption and ± ¹ K the capital depreciation. Note that we have removed here from
explicit consideration all imported consumption goods C2 and thus have reduced the
representation of aggregate demand to include only domestic consumption goods
C1 = C ¡ eC2: In view of this only exports X, which depend in a standard way
positively on the foreign output level (assumed for simplicity to be at its natural
level) and on the real exchange rate ´ = e=p (the foreign goods price still set equal
to one), have therefore to be considered from now on.
The dynamic multiplier is now based on the law of motion
_ Y = ¯y
£
C1(Y ¡ ¹ T) + I(¹ i
¤; ~ q
À(´);r; ~ q















It can easily be seen that the slope of the _ Y =0¡isocline depends on which of the
two opposite e®ects dominates: the balance-sheet-e®ect ÀI0(´) < 0 or the competi-
























From the shape of the assumed investment function we conclude (if its interior part is
su±ciently steeper than its counterpart in the export function) that for intermediate
values of ´ ( of ~ qÀ) the creditworthiness (the balance-sheet) e®ect is stronger than
the \normal" competitiveness e®ect, changing the slope of the _ Y = 0¡isocline and
therefore opening up the possibility of multiple equilibria now in the (´;Y ) phase
space. Note that the strength of the balance-sheet e®ect on the aggregate demand
depends on the degree of dollarization of liabilities in the economy À: For À = 1,
the balance-sheet e®ect operates with full strength, while for 0 < À < 1 this e®ect
operates only partially.
9The domestic monetary authorities are assumed to determine the short-term nominal
interest rate by the following Taylor rule
itr = (io ¡ ¹ ¼) + ^ p + ®p(^ p ¡ ¹ ¼) + ®u(u ¡ 1): (4)
where u = Y=¹ Y denotes the actual capacity utilization rate in the domestic economy,
io the steady state nominal interest rate and ¹ ¼ the in°ation rate targeted by the
domestic central bank. Concerning the remaining ¯nancial sector, we allow as in
R¿dseth (2000) the domestic and foreign currency denominated bonds to deliver
di®erent rates of return in the short run. The de¯ning ¯nancial market equations
are:




Risk Premium » = itr ¡¹ i
¤ ¡ ² (6)









Domestic Currency Bond Market
Bp
p = Wp ¡ f (»;Wp;·) (8)
Equilibrium Condition Fp + Fc + ¹ F¤ = 0 or Fp + Fc = ¡ ¹ F¤: (9)
Eq.(5) describes the initial ¯nancial wealth of the private sector, consisting of bonds
in domestic currency Bpo and foreign currency denominated bonds Fpo, all expressed
in real domestic currency terms. Domestic and foreign currency denominated bonds
are allowed to deliver di®erent rates of return, meaning that the uncovered interest
rate parity does not necessarily hold, at least in the short run. The resulting risk
premium of holding domestic currency bonds, i.e. the expected rate of return dif-
ferential between the two interest bearing ¯nancial assets, is represented by eq.(6).
² denotes the expected rate of currency depreciation, which we assume to be deter-
mined by
² = (eo=e ¡ 1):
For the steady state exchange rate eo, ²(eo) = 0 obviously holds. This expectation
formation mechanism can be considered as purely forward looking and in this respect
asymptotically rational, since the economic agents, having perfect knowledge of the
future steady state exchange rate e0, expect the actual exchange rate to converge
monotonically to it after each shock that a®ects the economy.
Eq.(7) represents the market equilibrium for foreign currency denominated bonds.
Hereby the demand for these type of ¯nancial assets is assumed to depend negatively
on the risk premium, positively on the private ¯nancial wealth and positively on
the parameter ·, which acts as a catch-all variable of foreign market pressures like
political instability or speculative herding behavior. Note that in contrast to Flaschel
10and Semmler (2003) here we do not explicitly model the domestic money market,
which we substituted by the Taylor rule given by eq.(4) and which we assume now
to be in equilibrium via Walras law of stocks.
The equilibrium condition for the foreign exchange market states that the aggregate
demands of the three sectors { domestic private sector and monetary authority,
and the foreign sector { always sum up to zero, see R¿dseth (2000, p.18). If we
assume that the supply of foreign-currency bonds available to the private sector
(additionally to its own stocks) is solely controlled by the monetary authorities,9
then the prevailing exchange rate depends on the disposition of the central bank to
supply the private sector with foreign-currency bonds.
By inserting eq.(5) in eq.(7), we obtain a market-based adjustment mechanism for
the nominal exchange rate (in the case of a °exible exchange rate regime) of the
following form





















tr(Y ) < 0:
Concerning the domestic price dynamics, we use a simple expectations augmented,
open-economy wage-price Phillips-curve (on the assumption of a constant produc-
tivity production function and mark-up pricing) which can be written as
^ p = ¯p(Y ¡ ¹ Y ) + ^ p
e
c with pc = p
µ(ep
¤)
1¡µ; µ 2 (0;1): (11)
We now use pc for the consumer price level, based on a geometric mean of the
domestic and the foreign price level, both expressed in the domestic currency. Su-
perscript e denotes expectations, implying that marked up domestic wage in°ation
is explained in this Phillips Curve by the output gap and the expected consumer





(Y ¡ ¹ Y ) or _ p = ~ ¯p(Y ¡ ¹ Y )p:
due to the assumption that the exchange rate as well as the foreign price level is
kept ¯xed and that in addition that current domestic in°ation is perfectly foreseen.
9This assumption can be justi¯ed by assuming as in R¿dseth (2000) that domestic bonds cannot
be traded internationally.
11Now, if we drop the assumption of a constant nominal exchange rate and allow it to
(eventually) °uctuate (and the agents to incorporate their expected exchange rate
changes in their price setting behavior), the Phillips Curve turns to
^ p = ~ ¯p(Y ¡ ¹ Y ) + ¯²(e0=e ¡ 1) or _ p =
³
~ ¯p(Y ¡ ¹ Y ) + ¯² (eo=e ¡ 1)
´
p: (12)
We now turn our attention to the real exchange rate ´ = e=p, which time derivative
_ ´ is given by
d´=dt =




(_ e ¡ e^ p):
From this formulation follows that _ ´ = 0 when ^ e = ^ p. This solution, nevertheless,
is not stable from a dynamic point of view and it additionally lacks of economic
foundations. The true solution for which the real exchange rate remains constant
(_ ´ = 0) is when simultaneously _ e = 0 and _ p = 0 hold. The ¯rst condition _ e = 0,
i.e. the equilibrium in the domestic ¯nancial (money, domestic and foreign currency)
markets is ful¯lled per de¯nition in a pegged exchange rate regime at every period of
time { eventually through central bank interventions in the foreign exchange market.
In the medium run, additionally, the nominal exchange rate is at its steady state
value, i.e. e = e0, so that _ ² = 0. In the absence of expected nominal exchange rate
depreciations in the medium run, _ p = 0 holds only if Y = ¹ Y . Since there is no
restriction on the domestic price level in the medium run, follows that the _ ´ = 0
isocline in the (´;Y )¡space is a vertical line which cuts the Y ¡ axis at Y = ¹ Y .
Note that in contrast to the _ p = 0 isocline described in Proa~ no et al. (2005), the
_ ´ = 0¡isocline here does not only represent the Phillips Curve and therefore the
medium run equilibrium in the labor markets, but it also represents the medium
run equilibrium in the ¯nancial markets. Here thus, we have a clear theory of real
exchange rate determination, which states that while the nominal exchange rate is
determined in the ¯nancial markets, the domestic price level is set primarily in the
goods and labor markets. Therefore we call the _ ´ = 0¡isocline the PCFM-curve.
3.1 The Role of the International Reserves
The level of the international reserves of a country is considered as one of the main
determinants for the propensity and fragility of a country to a speculative attack
on its domestic currency. Obviously, this depends on the exchange rate regime
which the country possesses. While in a °exible exchange rate system the domestic
central bank does not have to intervene in the foreign exchange market, in a pegged
exchange rate system the domestic monetary authorities are compromised to serve
any demand for foreign currency with their foreign exchange holdings. Since at
the onset of a speculative attack a country might be cut o® from foreign liquidity
12credit, the level of its international reserves determines its capability to defend the
prevailing currency peg, and therefore also the credibility of the latter.
We can incorporate these considerations in our theoretical model in the following
manner: While in a °exible exchange rate system the exchange rate dynamics are
still given by eq.(10), in case of a currency peg the dynamics of the international
reserves have to be considered. We assume thus that in this case the demand for
foreign currency bonds by the private sector is augmented by an additional term,

























c denotes the minimal, critical level of international reserves at which the
domestic monetary authorities would give up the currency peg and let the exchange
rate °oat. Obviously, for Fc ! F min
c , f0(Fc) ! +1. The dynamics of the inter-
national reserves in our basic theoretical model in a pegged exchange rate system
would then be determined by

























holds, a decrease in the international reserves leads to a higher foreign currency
demand by the domestic private sector and therefore to an accelerated lowering of
the international reserves, and viceversa. If the level of actual international reserves
dangerously decreases near to the minimum level of international reserves owned by
the domestic central bank F min
c { from an objective point of view as the liquidity
requirement to assure a frictionless international trade {, the domestic monetary
authorities would not have in the short run any other alternative but to give up the
prevailing peg and let the currency °oat. The dynamics of the °oating exchange
rate would then be determined by eq.(10).
133.2 Local Stability Analysis
The model consists, in the °exible exchange rate regime, of the following di®erential
equations:
_ Y = ¯y
£
C1(Y ¡ ¹ T) + I(¹ i
¤; ~ q
À(´);r; ~ q









io + (1 + ®p)(¯p(Y ¡ ¹ Y ) + ¯²(e0=e ¡ 1) ¡ ¹ ¼) + ®u(Y=¹ Y ¡ 1)
¡¹ i
¤ ¡ ¯"(eo=e ¡ 1);Wp;·) ¡ ´Fpo] ¡
³
~ ¯p(Y ¡ ¹ Y ) + ¯²(eo=e ¡ 1)
´
´
The ¯rst di®erential equation is the standard goods markets adjustment mechanism.
The second equation gathers eq.(10) and eq.(12) and represents the adjustment of
the real exchange rate to changes in Y . As it can easily be seen, for Y > ¹ Y the real
exchange rate appreciates, i.e. _ ´ < 0. This development results from two e®ects: on
the one hand, a rise in Y above ¹ Y leads to a nominal interest rate increase due to
the Taylor rule and therefore to a nominal exchange rate appreciation , i.e. _ e < 0.
On the other hand, for Y > ¹ Y follows that _ p > 0. The additional term of exchange
rate expectations only strengthens this e®ect (but it is not its main determinant).
For Y < ¹ Y , the opposite holds.




¯y [C0(Y ) ¡ 1] ¯y [ÀI0(´) + X0(´)]
¯e
p f0(»)((1 + ®p)¯p + ®u) ¡ ¯p´
¯e
p (f0(Wp)Fpo ¡ Fpo)
3
5:
Because of the nonlinearity of the _ Y =0¡isocline there exist in the considered situ-
ation three economically meaningful steady states, whose local stability properties
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Figure 4: The IS-PCFM Model
The resulting phase diagram of this currency crisis model is sketched in ¯gure 4.
Steady state E1 represents the \normal" steady state, where the economy's output
is high as well as the domestic investment activity. In this steady state, the standard
case jI0(´)j < X0(´) holds. Steady State E2 represents the fragile case with jI0(´)j >
X0(´): Because a slight deviation of the output level from this steady state level can
lead the economy to a short-run investment boom or to a decline in the economic
activity, this equilibrium point is unstable. Steady State E3 constitutes the \crisis
equilibrium". At this equilibrium point the investment activity is highly depressed
due to the high value of e. Nevertheless, the slope of the _ Y = 0¡isocline is again
positive because of jI0(´)j < X0(´) describing the dominance of exports over (the
remaining) investment demand in the considered situation.
4 Twin Crises Scenarios and Medium Run Real
Exchange Rate Adjustments
4.1 The Case of Total Liability Dollarization À = 1
In order to highlight the implications of the incorporation of the domestic interest
rate in the aggregate investment function of our model, we discuss ¯rst the resulting
dynamics for the complete liability dollarization case (À = 1), as it was the case
in Flaschel and Semmler (2003) and Proa~ no et al. (2005). Assume the economy is
initially situated at its NAIRU employment level in steady state E1. A speculative
attack on the domestic currency can be represented in our model by an increase of
the parameter ® in the foreign currency bond demand. As long as the monetary
authorities can defend the old currency peg, the °ight into foreign currency does
not have any e®ects besides the reduction of the foreign exchange reserves of the
15central bank according to eq.(14) (because a constant money supply is assumed,
a full sterilization of monetary base changes by the central bank is also implicitly
assumed). Now suppose that the central bank gives in to the foreign market pressure
due to, say, a dangerous approaching of the international reserves to the critical level
F min
c . As a result of a speculative attack on the domestic currency, the nominal
exchange rate devaluates sharply, triggering the activation of credit constraints by
the ¯nancial sector and depressing so the level of aggregate investment and therefore
of the entire economic activity. In the model discussed in Proa~ no et al. (2005), the
new exchange rate level after the one-time devaluation was assumed for simplicity
to be considered by the economic agents as \sustainable". Here, on the contrary,
this must not be the case, as we will discuss below.
In the (´;Y ) - space, the short run sharp nominal exchange rate devaluation is
represented by a \jump" of the value of ´ along the _ ´ = 0¡ isocline up to point
B.10 Now, due to the dynamic adjustment mechanism in the goods markets, Y
declines so that Y < ¹ Y . This development has two e®ects, as already discussed in
the previous section. On the one hand (assuming now a post-crisis °exible exchange
rate regime), a decrease in Y leads to a fall in the domestic interest rates and to a
higher demand for foreign bonds and, in a °exible exchange rate regime, to a further
rise in e. On the other hand, the underemployment situation leads to a fall in the
domestic price level, i.e. _ p < 0. Both e®ects lead to a strong depreciation of real
exchange rate, helping so the economy to return to its NAIRU employment level
through the expansion of the domestic exports. Obviously, in a post-crisis ¯xed
exchange rate regime, a much more severe de°ationary process than in a °exible
exchange rate regime is required for the domestic economy to return to its pre-crisis
NAIRU level of employment, as discussed in Proa~ no et al. (2005). These dynamics
are sketched in ¯gure 5. Since now the nominal exchange rate is allowed to °oat after
the occurrence of the currency crisis, there is no necessity for a severe de°ationary
process in order to reach the NAIRU consistent output again. Further nominal
exchange rate adjustments (in this case depreciations) can also contribute for the
real exchange rate to devalue.
As stated before, in the case of total liability dollarization, a defense of the prevailing
exchange rate level by the domestic monetary authorities does not have a direct
e®ect on the aggregate demand because the domestic ¯rms ¯nance their investment
projects completely through foreign currency credit. Theoretically, the monetary
authorities can thus inde¯nitely increase the domestic interest rates in order to
reduce the pressure on the exchange rate without directly a®ecting the real sector
of the economy. Such a measure can reduce the magnitude of an eventual nominal
10We assume that the nominal depreciation is of such magnitude that B lies above the unstable
steady state E2. We will discuss the case where B lies below E2 below.
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Figure 5: The Consequences of a Breakdown of the Currency Peg in the Case of
Total Liability Dollarization
depreciation and might even generate a short run expansion due to the expansion
of the net exports, if the real exchange rate jumps in the short run only to a point
B0 below the steady state E2.
Supplement: Dynamics with a \Kinked" Phillips Curve
As already Keynes (1936) noticed, an economy-wide wage and price de°ation of
great magnitude is unlikely to happen in modern economies. Indeed, numerous
studies have shown that wages are downwardly rigid in the majority of countries.
Taking this empirical fact into consideration the Phillips Curve can be modi¯ed in
the following way:
^ p = max
n
~ ¯p(Y ¡ ¹ Y ) + ¯² (eo=e ¡ 1);0
o
: (15)
This modi¯ed Phillips-Curve implies that in under-employment situations prices do
not fall but instead remain constant. Price changes can only take place in over-
employment situations, where the price level is assumed to rise as before.
The empirical observation of downwardly rigid wages had important consequences
for the dynamics of the model described in Proa~ no et al. (2005). Because in that
paper a post-crisis ¯xed exchange rate level was assumed, the price de°ation was
the only process which enabled the economy to return to the NAIRU-employment
level. If prices are downwardly rigid, the economy loses that recovery mechanism
and is \condemned" to remain at the \crisis equilibrium" as shown in Flaschel and
Semmler (2003).
Here, in contrast, downward wage rigidity does not \condemn" the economy to re-
main in such under-employment equilibria due to the absence of a way to re-gain
17competitiveness and therefore to increase the level of exports again. In the pres-
ence of downward rigidity the nominal exchange rate assumes the whole weight of
the recovery process so that further nominal (and also real) exchange rate depreci-
ations are needed to enhance the competitiveness of the domestic products in the
international goods markets and so to return to the NAIRU-production level.
4.2 The Case of Partial Liability Dollarization 0< À <1:
Modelling the Exchange Rate Policy Dilemma
We now analyse the dynamics of the model for the case where a fraction of the
domestic ¯rms does not issue foreign-currency debt but instead ¯nances its invest-
ment projects by domestic currency denominated credit. Despite the fact that the
_ Y = 0¡isocline has basically the same shape as in the previous section, as stated
before, the magnitude of the balance-sheet e®ect on the aggregate investment and
therefore on the aggregate demand depends on the degree of dollarization of liabili-
ties in the economy.
As previously discussed, in an economy with liabilities denominated only partially
in foreign currency, during a speculative attack on the domestic currency the mon-
etary authorities are confronted with a lose-lose situation. Exactly this situation
is represented when 0 < À < 1. In this case an increase of the domestic interest
rate (through a reduction of the money supply) has a direct e®ect on the aggre-
gate investment due to a subsequent decrease of the investments undertaken by the
fraction (1 ¡ À) of domestic ¯rms. In our model, such a response to a speculative
attack on the domestic currency does not only in°uence the dynamics of _ ´, but it
also shifts the _ Y = 0¡isocline to the left reducing the aggregate investment and
demand, as sketched in ¯gures 6 and 7. In the next sections we show that this
potential counterproductiveness of an increase in the domestic interest rate by the
monetary authorities depends on the elasticity of the aggregate demand with respect
to interest rate changes.
4.2.1 Dynamics after a Successful Defense of the Currency Peg
Under the assumption that the increase in the domestic nominal interest rate by
monetary authorities succeeds in lowering the pressure in the foreign exchange mar-
ket so that the prevailing exchange rate (or currency peg in case of a ¯xed exchange
rate regime) remains at its former level (or just slightly deviates from it), two sce-
narios are possible. If the elasticity of the aggregate investment with respect to
domestic interest rate changes is low (and/or the degree of liability dollarization in
the economy is particularly high), the _ Y = 0¡isocline will not signi¯cantly shift
18to the left and the economy will return to an equilibrium point very similar to the
pre-crisis equilibrium situation after a short term period of slight over-production
and -employment and a moderate domestic in°ation, as sketched in ¯gure 6a. If, on
the contrary, the elasticity of the aggregate demand to interest rate changes is high
(and/or the degree of liability dollarization is low), the IS-Curve will signi¯cantly
shift to the left and the E1 equilibrium point might be missed, as sketched in ¯gure
6b.
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Figure 6: Real Exchange Rate and Output Dynamics resulting from a Successful De-
fense of the Exchange Rate Level under a) Low and b) High Interest Rate Elasticity
of the Aggregate Investment
In this second case an increase in the domestic interest rate will thus lead to a severe
economic slowdown in the short run due to the fall in the aggregate demand despite
of the successful defense of the nominal exchange rate. In the medium run, the
equilibrium point E3 is the only steady state to which the economy can converge to.
Since Y < ¹ Y , the domestic price level will fall and _ ´ > 0, even though the nominal
exchange rate might be ¯xed. This decrease in the domestic price level enhances
the competitiveness of the domestic products in the international markets, thus
expanding the export volume and leading the economy in the medium run to the
full-employment level E3, nevertheless with a di®erent composition, namely high
exports and depressed investments. Note nevertheless that this recovery process
might only take place if the domestic wages and prices fall su±ciently to enhance in
a signi¯cant way the competitiveness of the domestic goods. If the domestic nominal
wages and prices are downwardly rigid as empirically is the case in the majority of
modern economies, then the economy might stay for a longer period in an unem-
ployment situation where the nominal exchange rate is constantly under pressure.
The government and the monetary authorities have in that case two alternatives:
either the government expands its expenditures (shifting the IS-Curve back to the
19right) or the monetary authorities give in to the foreign exchange market pressure
and devaluate the domestic currency, accelerating so the recovery process to E3.
4.2.2 Dynamics after a Failed Defense of the Currency Peg
The two possible scenarios discussed in the previous section were based on the as-
sumption that an interest rate increase by the domestic monetary authorities is
successful in the defense of the prevailing exchange rate (or currency peg in case of
a ¯xed exchange rate regime). Nevertheless, as the majority of currency crises in
the last decades have demonstrated, the foreign exchange market pressure can be
of such a magnitude that the monetary authorities might be forced to devalue or
let the nominal exchange rate °oat. In such a case the currency mismatch between
the assets and liabilities of the fraction of domestic ¯rms which ¯nance their invest-
ment projects through foreign currency credit takes place all in all, leading to the
activation of credit constraints by the ¯nancial sector and to a fall of the invest-
ment of the group of domestic ¯rms indebted in foreign currency. The investment
of the remaining ¯rms, which actually does not depend on the level of the nominal
exchange rate, is also a®ected due to the domestic interest rate increases under-
taken by the monetary authorities in their e®ort to defend the currency peg. The
aggregate consequences for the economy are then catastrophic, since not a fraction,
but the complete investment by entrepreneurial sector is depressed. The extent of
the investment decrease depends, of course, on the interest rate elasticity of the
aggregate demand, as shown in ¯gure 7.
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Figure 7: Real Exchange Rate and Output Dynamics resulting from a Failed Defense
of the Exchange Rate Level under a) Low and b) High Interest Rate Elasticity of
the Aggregate Investment
Figures 7a and 7b show an important insight: the higher the interest rate elasticity
of the aggregate demand, the longer is the recession period the economy experiences
20after the currency breakdown and the higher is equilibrium real exchange rate to
which the economy converges in the medium run as shown in ¯gure 7b. These
results are intuitive: the higher the interest rate elasticity of the aggregate demand,
the greater is the investment decrease and therefore the real exchange rate increase
which is needed for the economy to return to its NAIRU level of employment and
production. We see thus that a failed defense of the prevailing exchange rate by the
monetary authorities can have disastrous implications for the short- and medium
run performance of the economy.
4.2.3 An Unorthodox Measure against a Speculative Attack
Due to the potential occurrence of the scenarios discussed above some researchers
like Je®rey Sachs have pledged that not an increase, but a decrease in the domestic
interest rate is the right measure during a speculative attack on the domestic cur-
rency. Indeed, since the exchange rate per se does not have a real meaning for the
economic development, the monetary authorities might decide to bring the foreign
exchange market turmoil behind them once and for all and to stabilize or even to
enhance the economic activity by lowering the interest rates, irrespective of the ex-
change rate level. Such a measure will induce an even greater nominal exchange rate
depreciation, i.e. a jump from E1 to B0 as sketched in ¯gure 8. As shown there, the
resulting dynamics depend on whether the new nominal (and real in the short run)
exchange rate lies beneath or above the unstable new steady state E200.
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Figure 8: Two Possible Consequences of an Interest Rate Decrease as a Response
to a Speculative Attack a in Economy with Dollarized Liabilities
In ¯gure 8a, where the interest rate elasticity of the aggregate demand is low, the
IS¡Curve does not signi¯cantly shift to the right after the interest rate decrease, so
that B0 lies above E200 in the short run. The economy will experiment in this case a
21period of underemployment, depressed investment of the fraction of domestic ¯rms
indebted in foreign currency (due to the increase of the domestic currency value of
the foreign currency liabilities of that group) and falling prices (since Y < ¹ Y ) until
E30 is reached. Again, the enhancement of the net exports via real depreciation is
the channel which enables the economy to return to its NAIRU level of employment.
Nevertheless, the output loss in this case will probably be lower and the duration of
the economic slowdown shorter than in the previous cases where the exchange rate
was successfully defended but the aggregate investment was severely damaged, as
sketched in ¯gure 7.
In ¯gure 8b, where the interest rate elasticity of the aggregate demand is high, the
aggregate investment rises due to the decrease of the domestic interest rate, shifting
the IS¡Curve signi¯cantly to the right (perhaps even so much that E3 disappears
as sketched above), so that B0 lies below E200 in the short run (if E2 still exists), the
domestic interest rate decrease overcomes the negative balance sheet e®ect resulting
form the nominal depreciation of the domestic currency. In this scenario this nominal
devaluation ¯nally leads to an increase in the net exports and therefore, together with
the higher aggregate investment, to a period of over-production and -employment
in the economy. Nevertheless, due to the resulting increase in the domestic price
level (since Y > ¹ Y ), the domestic products will loose competitiveness and the net
exports will decrease over time, leading the economy to its NAIRU production level
at E10.
4.3 Interest Rate Sensitivity Analysis
In this section we attempt to identify in a more precise manner the main determinant
of the sharp investment decline in the analysed countries and in this way to control
for the real world relevance of the scenarios discussed in the previous section. Never-
theless, due to the uniqueness and high non-linearity of these ¯nancial episodes and
to the fact that both variables, nominal exchange rates as well as domestic interest
rates experienced the same \jumps" in the same time intervals, as also due to the
small number of available time series data, a direct econometric identi¯cation of the
main determinants (the nominal exchange rate depreciations or the sharp interest
rate increases) for these sharp investment declines is extremely di±cult to perform.
We therefore pursue an alternative, indirect strategy which can be summarized in the
following way: We ¯rst estimate the elasticity of aggregate investment with respect
to the domestic interest rate in the pre-crisis sub-samples of selected emerging market
countries. Thus, we estimate the intrinsic reaction of the economies with respect
to domestic interest rate increases (irrespective of their cause) before the respective
22currency and ¯nancial crises.11 For our analysis we use the same variables as in
the VARX analysis of a previous section. The OLS estimation results concerning
the pre-crisis interest rate semi-elasticities (autoregressive terms as well as seasonal
dummies and trends are omitted here but are available upon request) in the pre-crisis
sub-sample are reported in table 2.
Table 2: Domestic Interest Rate Semi-Elasticity of Aggregate Investment:
OLS Estimations Results
Sample Period Expl. Variable Coe®. Std. Errors t-Stat. ¹ R2
1991Q4-1994Q4 MX tbillrate(t-2) -0.012 0.001 -6.226 0.771
1991Q3-1997Q4 MA lendrate(t-1) -0.062 0.016 -3.882 0.938
1993Q4-1996Q4 TH lendrate(t-3) -0.042 0.003 -11.258 0.992
1990Q4-1997Q2 ND moneyrate(t-3) -0.008 0.002 -3.674 0.959
1981Q1-1997Q2 SK tbillrate(t-3) -0.006 0.002 -2.996 0.990
1990Q4-1997Q2 PH tbillrate(t-3) -0.011 0.004 -2.842 0.767
Figure 2 shows the estimated pre-crisis semi-elasticities of the selected countries
plotted against the post-crisis output loss. A positive correlation can be observed
between the interest rate semi-elasticity of aggregate demand and the subsequent
output loss after the respective sharp nominal exchange rate devaluations. Appar-
ently the countries with the higher interest rate semi-elasticities were the ones with
the higher output loss after the respective currency and ¯nancial crises.

















MX 0.012 0.323 (95Q2)
MA 0.062 0.801 (98Q3)
TH 0.042 0.602 (98Q2)
ND 0.008 0.594 (99Q1)
SK 0.006 0.256 (97Q3)
PH 0.011 0.262 (98Q4)
Figure 9: Interest Rate Semi-Elasticity (Y-Axis) and Output Loss (X-Axis)
Because the domestic interest rate increases resulting in part from the defense of
the currency peg were not of the same magnitude across the countries, we try to
11We do not do the same for the exchange rate elasticity of the aggregate investment since, from
the theoretical point of view, in tranquil periods no direct relationship between these two variables
can be expected. The e®ect of a nominal depreciation on investment is theoretically de¯ned as
highly nonlinear, see Krugman (2000).
23approximate the direct impact of these interest rate increases on aggregate invest-
ment during the speculative attacks by weighting geometrically these interest rate
increases with the respective country-speci¯c semi-elasticities of the aggregate in-
vestment (we assume here that the interest rate elasticity of aggregate investment
remained unchanged by the respective crises). We plot then in ¯gure 10 the re-
sulting series again against the respective post-crisis output loss (proxied by the
negative growth rates of aggregate investment after the respective crises marked by
the shaded areas in ¯gure 1).


















MX 1.048 0.323 (95Q2)
MA 1.057 0.801 (98Q3)
TH 1.039 0.602 (98Q2)
ND 1.034 0.594 (99Q1)
SK 1.009 0.256 (97Q3)
PH 1.023 0.262 (98Q4)
Figure 10: Interest Rate Impact (Y-Axis) and Post-Crisis Output Loss (X-Axis)
As expected, a positive correlation can be observed. This graphical result can be
interpreted in the following way: a sharp increase in the domestic interest rates
caused in countries with a high intrinsic interest rate elasticity a greater output loss
than in countries where the elasticity was low. For comparison we show in ¯gure
11 the largest exchange rate increase, geometrically weighted with the end of 1996
short term liabilities to BIS banks (as percentage of GDP).12
Surprisingly, it seems that the great nominal exchange rate devaluation, weighted
by the intrinsic degree of liability dollarization in the respective economies, is less
correlated with the large output losses observed in the quarters following the cur-
rency and ¯nancial crises than the interest rate increases. These results deliver a
new insight on the real causes for the large output decrease in the countries facing a
speculative attack on their currencies and relativizes the importance of the liability
dollarization issue for the development of aggregate investment.
As stated before, the lack of adequate data represents a great problem for the em-
pirical analysis of the Mexican and East Asian Crises since it makes the econometric
12This measure is commonly used as a proxy for the degree of liability dollarization in an economy,
see e.g. Goldstein and Turner (2004). Other proxies for the degree of liability dollarization in the
economy as the ratio of short term liabilities to foreign reserves or the ratio of liabilities to assets
towards BIS banks delivered similar results.

















MA 0.823 0.801 (98Q3)
TH 0.755 0.602 (98Q2)
ND 1.082 0.594 (99Q1)
SK 0.092 0.256 (97Q3)
PH 0.873 0.262 (98Q4)
Figure 11: Exchange Rate Impact (Y-Axis) and Post-Crisis Output Loss (X-Axis)
analysis more di±cult in a great manner due to the small number of observations
available. Nevertheless, we think that the basic procedure discussed in this section
delivers some insights on the true determinants of the large output losses after these
currency and ¯nancial crises.
5 Conclusions
The right strategy to be followed by the domestic monetary authorities during a
speculative attack is an issue which is far from being solved and which will attract
the attention of researchers and policy makers in the coming years. We contribute
to this discussion by showing in a theoretic framework that both strategies (the
increase or decrease the domestic interest rates) can turn out to be bene¯cial for the
short and medium run performance of the economy. In our model the traditional
strategy (backed by the IMF during the East Asian Crisis) of raising the interest rates
proves to be counterproductive if the aggregate demand reacts (more) elastically to
domestic interest rate changes (than to nominal exchange rate devaluations). This
strategy can turn out to be the adequate one only if the interest rate changes do
not a®ect in a great manner the aggregate investment and therefore the aggregate
demand of the economy.
The most unorthodox alternative, namely a decrease in the interest rates, might be
considered as more problematic from the short run point of view since it might pro-
voke an even more sharper depreciation of the nominal exchange rate. Nevertheless,
such a measure might be more bene¯cial in the medium run since a) it might lower
the output loss and the duration of the economic recession or b) it might induce a
short run over employment situation through a real exchange rate depreciation and
a resulting expansion of the net exports volume as well as an in°ationary process.
25These results, together with the empirical ¯ndings of the last section, highlight the
importance of the consideration of country-speci¯c characteristics in the exchange
rate policy making. Ready-made solutions of the one-size-¯ts-all type can bring
heterogeneous and, more important, adverse results in countries with di®erent char-
acteristics. If the fraction of the liabilities denominated in foreign currency is not
signi¯cantly high and the aggregate demand of the remaining ¯rms react elastically
to interest rate changes, the unorthodox alternative of lowering the interest rate and
let the nominal exchange rate °oat might be a better medium run oriented strategy
for the domestic monetary authorities to follow, even if its short run e®ects might
seem radical and counterproductive.
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics
Country Variable Sample Obs Mean Min Max Std.Dev JB-Prob.
exchrate lg 1990Q1-2003Q1 53 1.764 0.989 2.022 0.518 0.023
MX tbillrate lg 1990Q1-2003Q1 53 2.917 1.880 4.100 0.523 0.917
investment lg 1990Q1-2003Q1 53 5.971 5.613 6.274 0.175 0.269
exchrate lg 1991Q1-2003Q1 49 1.123 0.901 1.400 0.197 0.024
MA lendrate lg 1991Q1-2003Q1 49 2.080 1.854 2.502 0.167 0.367
investment lg 1991Q1-2003Q1 49 9.828 9.498 10.32 0.231 0.135
exchrate lg 1993Q1-2002Q1 37 3.471 3.203 3.852 0.247 0.084
TH lendrate lg 1993Q1-2002Q1 37 2.375 1.945 2.724 0.256 0.180
investment lg 1993Q1-2002Q1 37 5.729 5.286 6.186 0.289 0.158
exchrate lg 1990Q1-2001Q4 48 7.742 7.502 9.413 0.695 0.023
ND moneyrate lg 1990Q1-2001Q4 48 2.566 1.900 4.306 0.577 0.000
investment lg 1990Q1-2001Q4 48 10.282 9.586 10.77 0.208 0.009
exchrate lg 1990Q1-2003Q1 53 6.861 6.554 7.435 0.248 0.064
SK tbillrate lg 1990Q1-2003Q1 53 2.259 1.386 3.173 0.524 0.064
investment lg 1990Q1-2003Q1 53 10.35 10.00 10.54 0.126 0.342
exchrate lg 1990Q1-2003Q1 53 3.489 3.118 3.990 0.284 0.041
PH lendrate lg 1990Q1-2003Q1 53 2.505 1.531 2.541 0.396 0.630
investment lg 1990Q1-2003Q1 53 4.676 4.379 4.676 0.128 0.306
296.2 Statistics for VARX Model Selection
Table 4: Schwarz Bayesian VAR Lag Length Selection Criteria
Lags MX MA TH ND SK PH
0 1.474 -1.591 -0.848 2.999 -0.700 -0.917
1 -7.739 -7.510* -7.175* -3.373* -7.659 -6.671*
2 -7.905* -7.215 -6.872 -3.240 -8.117* -6.314
3 -7.577 -6.971 -6.905 -3.142 -8.094 -5.896
4 -7.434 -6.921 -6.567 -3.039 -7.583 -5.354
5 -6.856 -6.370 -5.967 -2.836 -7.044 -4.899
6 -6.370 -5.762 -5.725 -2.528 -6.690 -4.544
Table 5: Residual Serial Correlation LM-Tests
H0: No Serial Correlation at Lag Order h. Probs from Chi-Square with 9 DFs
Lag MX MA TH ND SK PH
1 0.1479 0.0049 0.1349 0.0034 0.0002 0.1346
2 0.8761 0.0070 0.1832 0.3669 0.2340 0.0595
3 0.6915 0.3359 0.0195 0.3207 0.8823 0.8778
4 0.7882 0.2362 0.9898 0.3292 0.8882 0.1344
5 0.7046 0.6483 0.0031 0.0173 0.2753 0.2362
6 0.0283 0.3015 0.0288 0.8298 0.6693 0.0910
7 0.4765 0.5400 0.2478 0.9164 0.8256 0.0066
8 0.2146 0.8300 0.8809 0.6179 0.2686 0.4955
9 0.9168 0.7342 0.5277 0.7469 0.8055 0.1958
10 0.9653 0.3624 0.4262 0.9871 0.6591 0.6801




Date: 10/10/05 Time: 22:22
Sample (adjusted): 1990Q3 2003Q1
Included observations: 51 after adjustments
Standard errors in ( ) & t-statistics in [ ]
_______________________________________________________________________
MX_EXCHRATE_LG MX_TBILLRATE_LG MX_INVESTM95_LG_SA
MX_EXCHRATE_LG(-1) 1.117042 1.390330 -0.132268
(0.11705) (0.60308) (0.12591)
[9.54294] [2.30538] [-1.05047]
MX_EXCHRATE_LG(-2) -0.092006 -1.430013 0.165713
(0.12144) (0.62570) (0.13064)
[-0.75760] [-2.28546] [1.26851]
MX_TBILLRATE_LG(-1) -0.035370 0.728756 -0.052744
(0.03551) (0.18295) (0.03820)
[-0.99606] [3.98331] [-1.38084]
MX_TBILLRATE_LG(-2) 0.012133 0.127569 0.047817
(0.03665) (0.18885) (0.03943)
[0.33101] [0.67550] [1.21274]
MX_INVESTM95_LG_SA(-1) -0.086000 1.089350 1.030374
(0.10722) (0.55242) (0.11534)
[-0.80208] [1.97196] [8.93368]
MX_INVESTM95_LG_SA(-2) -0.041132 -0.953798 -0.182227
(0.10145) (0.52269) (0.10913)
[-0.40544] [-1.82477] [-1.66982]
C 0.796970 -0.422011 0.873311
(0.34213) (1.76272) (0.36803)
[2.32942] [-0.23941] [2.37296]




R-squared 0.996430 0.906154 0.962752
Adj. R-squared 0.995848 0.890877 0.956688
Sum sq. resids 0.045687 1.212756 0.052864
S.E. equation 0.032596 0.167939 0.035063
F-statistic 1714.350 59.31425 158.7728
Log likelihood 106.5870 22.97686 102.8664
Akaike AIC -3.866156 -0.587328 -3.720249
Schwarz SC -3.563125 -0.284296 -3.417218
Mean dependent 1.794499 2.886059 5.982341
S.D. dependent 0.505888 0.508388 0.168478
Determinant resid covariance (dof adj.) 1.66E-08
Determinant resid covariance 9.93E-09
Log likelihood 252.8171






Date: 10/10/05 Time: 21:43
Sample (adjusted): 1991Q2 2003Q1
Included observations: 48 after adjustments
Standard errors in ( ) & t-statistics in [ ]
____________________________________________________________________
MA_EXCHRATE_LG MA_LENDRATE_LG MA_INVESTM95_LG
MA_EXCHRATE_LG(-1) 1.048237 -0.088514 -0.308764
(0.03582) (0.04883) (0.09362)
[29.2633] [-1.81282] [-3.29790]
MA_LENDRATE_LG(-1) 0.051525 0.891228 -0.202598
(0.03906) (0.05325) (0.10210)
[1.31900] [16.7375] [-1.98430]
MA_INVESTM95_LG(-1) 0.100578 0.073856 0.758094
(0.02824) (0.03850) (0.07382)
[3.56118] [1.91847] [10.2698]




R-squared 0.959408 0.895823 0.795945
Adj. R-squared 0.956640 0.888720 0.782032
Sum sq. resids 0.075256 0.139824 0.514096
S.E. equation 0.041357 0.056372 0.108093
F-statistic 346.6524 126.1193 57.20934
Log likelihood 86.88445 72.01670 40.76806
Akaike AIC -3.453519 -2.834029 -1.532003
Schwarz SC -3.297585 -2.678096 -1.376069
Mean dependent 1.126030 2.081734 9.835239
S.D. dependent 0.198610 0.168988 0.231526
Determinant resid covariance (dof adj.) 5.50E-08
Determinant resid covariance 4.23E-08
Log likelihood 203.1401






Date: 10/10/05 Time: 16:36
Sample (adjusted): 1993Q2 2002Q1
Included observations: 36 after adjustments
Standard errors in ( ) & t-statistics in [ ]
______________________________________________________________________
TH_EXCHRATE_LG TH_LENDRATE_LG TH_INVESTM95_LG_SA
TH_EXCHRATE_LG(-1) 1.051637 0.125351 -0.427544
(0.09820) (0.06423) (0.10518)
[10.7088] [1.95171] [-4.06480]
TH_LENDRATE_LG(-1) -0.020570 0.919620 -0.156389
(0.05598) (0.03661) (0.05996)
[-0.36745] [25.1177] [-2.60826]
TH_INVESTM95_LG_SA(-1) 0.088368 0.250897 0.708782
(0.08405) (0.05497) (0.09002)
[1.05141] [4.56438] [7.87357]




R-squared 0.927020 0.971642 0.940096
Adj. R-squared 0.920179 0.968983 0.934480
Sum sq. resids 0.157059 0.067180 0.180176
S.E. equation 0.070058 0.045819 0.075037
F-statistic 135.4930 365.4723 167.3965
Log likelihood 46.74196 62.02827 44.27035
Akaike AIC -2.374553 -3.223793 -2.237242
Schwarz SC -2.198607 -3.047846 -2.061295
Mean dependent 3.477958 2.373742 5.726225
S.D. dependent 0.247969 0.260164 0.293148
Determinant resid covariance (dof adj.) 4.83E-08
Determinant resid covariance 3.39E-08
Log likelihood 156.3554






Date: 10/14/05 Time: 17:38
Sample (adjusted): 1990Q2 2001Q4
Included observations: 47 after adjustments
Standard errors in ( ) & t-statistics in [ ]
______________________________________________________________________
ND_EXCHRATE_LG ND_MONEYRATE_LG ND_INVESTM95_LG_SA
ND_EXCHRATE_LG(-1) 0.977995 -0.040763 -0.004416
(0.02539) (0.06442) (0.03288)
[38.5210] [-0.63275] [-0.13428]
ND_MONEYRATE_LG(-1) -0.007791 0.832161 -0.044933
(0.03118) (0.07910) (0.04038)
[-0.24991] [10.5198] [-1.11278]
ND_INVESTM95_LG_SA(-1) 0.128087 0.393532 0.662844
(0.07624) (0.19345) (0.09874)
[1.68010] [2.03433] [6.71273]
C -1.096294 -3.254417 3.625069
(0.75866) (1.92503) (0.98263)
[-1.44504] [-1.69058] [3.68915]




R-squared 0.980787 0.821990 0.591699
Adj. R-squared 0.978957 0.805036 0.552813
Sum sq. resids 0.428130 2.756487 0.718227
S.E. equation 0.100963 0.256185 0.130769
F-statistic 536.0038 48.48532 15.21632
Log likelihood 43.72406 -0.039629 31.56615
Akaike AIC -1.647832 0.214452 -1.130474
Schwarz SC -1.451008 0.411277 -0.933650
Mean dependent 8.172014 2.739347 10.28690
S.D. dependent 0.696003 0.580198 0.195552
Determinant resid covariance (dof adj.) 1.05E-05
Determinant resid covariance 7.46E-06
Log likelihood 77.36642






Date: 10/14/05 Time: 16:05
Sample (adjusted): 1990Q3 2003Q1
Included observations: 51 after adjustments
Standard errors in ( ) & t-statistics in [ ]
______________________________________________________________________
SK_EXCHRATE_LG SK_TBILLRATE_LG SK_INVESTM95_LG_SA
SK_EXCHRATE_LG(-1) 0.666015 0.443194 -0.236598
(0.05834) (0.15548) (0.05237)
[11.4170] [2.85052] [-4.51741]
SK_EXCHRATE_LG(-2) 0.239331 -0.849955 0.149110
(0.06234) (0.16615) (0.05597)
[3.83911] [-5.11552] [2.66411]
SK_TBILLRATE_LG(-1) 0.013442 1.140675 -0.044824
(0.03878) (0.10337) (0.03482)
[0.34659] [11.0352] [-1.28729]
SK_TBILLRATE_LG(-2) -0.033382 -0.332019 0.001586
(0.03635) (0.09688) (0.03263)
[-0.91836] [-3.42714] [0.04859]
SK_INVESTM95_LG_SA(-1) 0.070488 -0.047530 0.833021
(0.16202) (0.43182) (0.14546)
[0.43506] [-0.11007] [5.72664]
SK_INVESTM95_LG_SA(-2) 0.018711 0.104549 0.073021
(0.15352) (0.40918) (0.13784)
[0.12188] [0.25551] [0.52977]
C -0.226742 2.603912 1.682887
(0.61375) (1.63579) (0.55103)
[-0.36944] [1.59184] [3.05406]




R-squared 0.979159 0.968207 0.919313
Adj. R-squared 0.975767 0.963032 0.906178
Sum sq. resids 0.062817 0.446219 0.050635
S.E. equation 0.038221 0.101868 0.034316
F-statistic 288.6120 187.0741 69.98889
Log likelihood 98.46787 48.47282 103.9651
Akaike AIC -3.547760 -1.587169 -3.763338
Schwarz SC -3.244728 -1.284138 -3.460307
Mean dependent 6.873426 2.246830 10.36750
S.D. dependent 0.245526 0.529817 0.112031
Determinant resid covariance (dof adj.) 1.42E-08
Determinant resid covariance 8.53E-09
Log likelihood 256.6891






Date: 10/14/05 Time: 16:33
Sample (adjusted): 1990Q2 2003Q1
Included observations: 52 after adjustments
Standard errors in ( ) & t-statistics in [ ]
_______________________________________________________________________
PH_EXCHRATE_LG PH_TBILLRATE_LG PH_INVESTM95_LG_SA
PH_EXCHRATE_LG(-1) 0.988844 -0.207142 -0.016199
(0.03074) (0.10343) (0.04474)
[32.1660] [-2.00269] [-0.36202]
PH_TBILLRATE_LG(-1) 0.014932 0.853845 -0.095878
(0.02319) (0.07801) (0.03375)
[0.64405] [10.9457] [-2.84116]
PH_INVESTM95_LG_SA(-1) 0.121817 0.042144 0.676212
(0.06446) (0.21689) (0.09383)
[1.88970] [0.19431] [7.20706]
C -0.553068 0.862541 1.813348
(0.32911) (1.10730) (0.47902)
[-1.68049] [0.77896] [3.78554]




R-squared 0.975973 0.859464 0.758825
Adj. R-squared 0.973928 0.847503 0.738300
Sum sq. resids 0.097909 1.108331 0.207418
S.E. equation 0.045642 0.153563 0.066432
F-statistic 477.2731 71.85829 36.96991
Log likelihood 89.36406 26.27329 69.84602
Akaike AIC -3.244771 -0.818203 -2.494078
Schwarz SC -3.057152 -0.630584 -2.306458
Mean dependent 3.496652 2.495650 4.677349
S.D. dependent 0.282666 0.393238 0.129859
Determinant resid covariance (dof adj.) 1.59E-07
Determinant resid covariance 1.18E-07
Log likelihood 193.5177




Publisher: Hans-Böckler-Stiftung, Hans-Böckler-Str. 39, 40476 Düsseldorf, Germany 
Phone: +49-211-7778-331, IMK@boeckler.de, http://www.imk-boeckler.de  
 





The views expressed in this paper do not necessarily reflect those of the IMK or the Hans-Böckler-Foundation. 
 
All rights reserved. Reproduction for educational and non-commercial purposes is permitted provided that  
the source is acknowledged. 